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Abstract 
John Maynard Smith has defended against philosophical criticism the view that 
developmental biology is the study of the expression of information encoded in the genes 
by natural selection. However, like other naturalistic concepts of information, this 
‘teleosemantic’ information applies to many non-genetic factors in development. 
Maynard Smith also fails to show that developmental biology is concerned with 
teleosemantic information. Some other ways to support Maynard Smith’s conclusion are 
considered. It is argued that on any definition of information the view that development is 
the expression of genetic information is misleading. Some reasons for the popularity of 
that view are suggested. 
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1. Introduction: Information Talk in Biology 
An organism's physiology and behaviour are dictated largely by its genes. And those 
genes are merely repositories of information written in a surprisingly similar manner 
to the one that computer scientists have devised for the storage and transmission of 
other information... (Economist 1999, 97) 
The only controversial feature of this statement is the claim that behavior is largely 
genetic. It is conventional wisdom that insofar as the traits of an organism are subject to 
biological explanation, those traits express information coded in the organism’s genes. 
Conventional wisdom has recently been defended in this journal by the eminent biologist 
John Maynard Smith (Maynard Smith 2000). I will argue, however, that the only truth 
reflected in the conventional view is that there is a genetic code by which the sequence of 
DNA bases in the coding regions of a gene corresponds to the sequence of amino acids in 
the primary structure of one or more proteins. The rest of 'information talk' in biology is 
no more than a picturesque way to talk about correlation and causation. The claim that 
biology 'is, itself, an information technology' (Economist 1999, 97) is on a par with the 
claim that the planets compute their orbits around the sun. Taking 'information talk' in 
biology too seriously is not merely a journalist's error. Many biologists, when asked to 
talk about their discipline in broad, philosophical terms, would represent it in the same 
light. Nevertheless, as Sahotra Sarkar has noted: 
there is no clear, technical notion of "information" in molecular biology.  It is little 
more than a metaphor that masquerades as a theoretical concept and ...leads to a 
misleading picture of possible explanations in molecular biology. (Sarkar 1996,187) 
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Correcting the conventional wisdom is important in its own right, but it also clears the 
ground for an important, new approach to the debate over 'genetic determinism'. Phillip 
Kitcher has joked that arguing against genetic determinism is like battling the undead 
(Kitcher In Press). The 'interactionist consensus' that all traits depend on both genetic and 
environmental factors has been reaffirmed again and again, but the discovery that genes 
are involved in the development of a trait continues to be used to infer that the trait will 
be hard to change by manipulating the environment. This inference persists in the face of 
widespread agreement that there are always other causal factors involved in the 
development of 'genetic’ traits and many examples of ‘genetic’ traits being modified via 
these factors. For example, genetic diseases can be treated by environmental (i.e: drug or 
dietary) interventions. "But why, then," Kitcher’s frustrated interactionist asks, "do we 
always end up discussing whether genotypes are all-powerful in development?" (Kitcher 
In Press). In my view, an important part of the answer has been given by Susan Oyama 
(Oyama 2000a, 2000b). Genetic causation is interpreted deterministically because genes 
are thought to be a special kind of cause. Genes are instructions - they provide 
information - whilst other causal factors are merely material. The intuitive notion of 
information is a semantic notion, carrying the implication that genes, unlike other causal 
factors, are about, or directed at, the outcomes they help to produce. Little wonder, then, 
that the gene-trait relationship seems intuitively more context-independent than the 
relationship between traits and other causes. The temperature of the nest determines the 
sex of an crocodile, the eggs developing as male at intermediate temperature and female 
at extreme temperatures, but outside that very particular context the cause – a mound of 
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rotting vegetation with a temperature between n and m degrees - retains no connection 
with masculinity.  In contrast, even when the informational gene fails to produce its 
effect, it remains directed at that effect.  A 'gay gene' is an instruction to be gay even 
when the person carrying it is straight.  
 
If Oyama is correct, then finding a new way to think about genetic causation is a 
necessary prerequisite to laying the unquiet ghost of the nature/nurture controversy and 
learning to think clearly about the interaction of genetic and other factors in development. 
It is this prospect that makes it important to bring home the fact that 'information talk' in 
biology is merely picturesque. But the deflation of information talk in biology is logically 
independent of Oyama's larger claim about the causes of genetic determinism. Kitcher, 
for example, accepts a deflationary account of information talk, but rejects Oyama's claim 
that loose information talk sustains genetic determinism (Kitcher In Press). The position I 
will defend here is not the entire Oyama package - the 'developmental systems theory' - 
but only what I have elsewhere called the 'parity thesis' (Griffiths and Knight 1998). Any 
defensible definition of information in developmental biology is equally applicable to 
genetic and non-genetic causal factors in development. Definitions of information on 
which genes contain developmental information but methylation patterns or incubation 
temperatures do not are illegitimate because they cannot be 'naturalised' - they ascribe 
properties to genes that cannot be grounded in physical and biological facts. Hence, if 
discarding information talk would be useful, there is no substantial, biological reason not 
to discard it. 
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2. Two Concepts of Information 
Concepts of information can be divided into two rough categories - causal information 
concepts and intentional information concepts. Causal conceptions of information derive 
from the mathematical theory of communication (Shannon and Weaver 1949). 
Mathematical information theory studies only the quantity of information in a physical 
system. The quantity of information in a system can be understood roughly as the amount 
of order in that system, or the inverse of the entropy (disorder) that all closed physical 
systems accumulate over time. This measure says nothing about the content of 
information. However, there is a related causal notion of information content (Dretske 
1981). Information flows over a channel connecting two systems, a receiver that contains 
the information and a sender, the system that the information is about. There is a channel 
between two systems when the state of one is systematically causally related to the other, 
so that the state of the sender can be discovered by observing the state of the reciever. 
The causal information content of a signal is simply the state of affairs with which it 
reliably correlated at the other end of the channel. Thus, smoke carries information about 
fire and disease phenotypes carry information about disease genes. 
 
The second category of information concept deals with intentional information or 
'semantic information' (Godfrey-Smith 1999). It is information in this sense that human 
thoughts and utterances are supposed to contain. If there is a relationship between 
intentional information and causal information it is a complex and distant one. We think 
about things with which we have only the most tenuous causal connection (e.g: 
undiscovered galaxies) and about things that do not exist (e.g: phlogiston or Pope Joan). 
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The relation between thoughts and these various objects of thought is 'intentionality’ and 
the question of how physical systems like brains can exhibit intentionality is one of the 
most vexed issues in the philosophy of mind. One of the distinctive features of intentional 
information is that it can be false - it can misrepresent how things are (Godfrey-Smith 
1989). It is difficult to reproduce the phenomena of misrepresentation using a causal 
notion of information. A signal cannot both correlate with a source and not correlate with 
it, nor can a signal correlate with a source that does not exist. The most promising 
attempts to give a naturalistic account of intentional information are the so-called 
‘teleosemantic’ theories to be discussed below, according to which a sign represents 
whatever evolution designed it to represent. Genetic information is usually described as if 
misinterpretation made sense and hence appears to be intentional information. For 
instance, it is a commonplace to say that a genome contains a 'disjunctive program' or 
'open program'. The genetic message takes the form 'develop like this under these 
circumstances, like that under other circumstances’. Evolutionary psychologists seek to 
explain cultural differences between human minds as just this kind of disjunctive 
response of the human developmental program to various environmental factors 
(Cosmides, Tooby et al. 1992). In contrast, no one says that the human genome encodes 
the instruction 'when exposed to the drug thalidomide grow only rudimentary limbs'. This 
would be one branch of the disjunctive program if we were talking about the causal 
information in the human genome. When the relevant channel is contaminated by 
thalidomide, human genes send this causal information. The fact that the notion of a 
disjunctive program is not applied to outcomes that are thought to be pathological or 
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accidental suggests that the information in the program is usually conceived of as 
intentional information.  
 
3. Maynard Smith on Genetic Information 
The obvious way to defend information talk in biology is to argue that it is just like the 
many other, scientifically respectable uses of causal information. This has been the 
traditional strategy. In an address to the Fifth International Congress of Evolutionary and 
Systematic Biology in 1996, John Maynard-Smith made use of this conventional defense. 
Information talk in biology is to be interpreted 'more or less in the spirit of information 
theory' (author's notes).  The disadvantage of this defense is that it implies parity between 
genetic and non-genetic causes in development. Information in the sense legitimated by 
information theory is the systematic dependence of a signal on a source, a dependence 
that is created by a set of channel conditions.  In the case of development, the genes are 
normally taken to be the source, the life-cycle of the organism is the signal and the 
channel conditions are all the other resources needed for the life-cycle to unfold.  But it is 
a fundamental feature of information theory that the role of source and channel condition 
can be reversed.   The old television 'test-card' did exactly that, holding the transmission 
constant so that the television engineer could read off the state of what were previously 
channel conditions. The source/channel distinction is imposed on a natural causal system 
by the observer. A source is simply one channel condition whose current state the signal 
is being used to investigate.  If all other resources are held constant, a life-cycle can give 
us information about the genes, but if the genes are held constant, a life-cycle can give us 
information about whichever other resource we decided to let vary. So far as causal 
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information goes, every resource whose state affects development is a source of 
developmental information (Johnston 1987; Gray 1992; Griffiths and Gray 1994; Oyama 
2000a). 
   
The fact that causal information conforms to this ‘parity thesis’ is now quite widely 
recognized (Godfrey-Smith 1999; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; Maynard Smith 2000; 
Kitcher In Press). In his most recent discussion of causal information, Maynard Smith 
notes that: 
With this definition, there is no difficulty in saying that a gene carries information 
about adult form; an individual with the gene for achondroplasia will have short arms 
and legs. But we can equally well say that a baby's environment carries information 
about growth; if it is malnourished, it will be underweight. (Maynard Smith 2000, 
189) 
In response to the threat of parity, Maynard Smith has abandoned the idea that biological 
information is causal information. He continues: 
informational language has been used to characterize genetic as opposed to 
environmental causes. I want now to try to justify this usage. 
I will argue that the distinction can be justified only if the concept of information is 
used in biology only for causes that have the property of intentionality.... A DNA 
molecule has a particular sequence because it specifies a particular protein, but a 
cloud is not black because it predicts rain. This element of intentionality comes from 
natural selection. (Maynard Smith 2000, 189-90) 
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Maynard Smith proposes to analyse the intentionality of genetic information using 
teleosemantics, the philosophical program of reducing meaning to biological function 
(teleology) and then reducing teleology to natural selection (Millikan 1984; Papineau 
1987). Whilst there is considerable controversy about whether such reductions can be 
successfully carried out, teleosemantics remains one of the more popular programs for 
naturalizing intentionality. Maynard Smith begins by arguing that natural selection is 
strongly analogous to computer programming using the 'genetic algorithm' technique. 
The genetic algorithm programmer randomly varies the code of a computer program and 
selects variants for their performance. In the same way, natural selection randomly varies 
the genes of organisms and selects those organisms for their fitness. Just as the function 
of the selected computer program is to perform the task for which it was selected, the 
biological function of successful genes is to produce the developmental outcomes in 
virtue of which they were selected. Such genes are intentionally directed onto, or about, 
those effects. The defective haemoglobin gene in some human populations, which has 
been selected because it sometimes confers resistance to malaria, carries teleosemantic 
information about malaria resistance.  
 
However, teleosemantic information is fundamentally unsuited to Maynard-Smith's aim 
of avoiding parity. The most developed version of the teleosemantic theory of genetic 
information is Sterelny et al's 'extended replicator theory' (Sterelny, Dickison et al. 1996).  
Sterelny and his collaborators recognize from the outset that teleosemantic information 
exists in both genetic and in some non-genetic developmental causes. Sterelny reiterates 
this view in his reply to Maynard Smith (Sterelny 2000). Russell Gray and I have argued 
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that teleosemantic information exists in a very much wider range of developmental 
causes that Sterelny et al suggest (Griffiths and Gray 1997), but my argument here 
follows even on the more conservative view. Teleosemantic information exists in any 
inheritance system that is a product of evolution, including epigenetic inheritance 
systems. The term 'epigenetic inheritance system' is used to denote any biological 
mechanisms which produces resemblances between parents and offspring and which 
works in parallel with the inheritance of nuclear and mitochondrial (Jablonka and Lamb 
1995; Jablonka and Szathmáry 1995). Every organism inherits a great deal besides its 
DNA. To develop normally the egg cell must contain features such as: basal bodies and 
microtubule organising centres, correct cytoplasmic chemical gradients, DNA 
methylation patterns, membranes and organelles, as well as DNA. Changes in these other 
resources can cause heritable variation which appears in all the cells descended from that 
egg cell. One of the best-understood of these mechanisms is the DNA methylation 
inheritance system. A methylation pattern is a series of additional chemical groups 
attached to a DNA sequence. Methylation patterns block transcription of any genes they 
cover and they are replicated by the methylation copying system in all the cells 
descended from a given cell.  Differences in methylation are important in tissue 
differentiation during the lifetime of a single organism, but they can also pass between 
the generations. Methylation patterns are often applied to the DNA in a sperm or egg by 
the parent organism. DNA methylation inheritance has excited a great deal of interest 
because of it is easy to see how it could play a role in conventional, micro-evolutionary 
change. A typical example comes from some controversial British research on behavioral 
differences in male and female children. The proposed mechanism for the transmission of 
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these behavioral differences is that female humans methylate a sequence of the X-
chromosome in their gametes, so that males, who get only one X-chromosome and get it 
from their mother, cannot transcribe the genes in that region. Hence certain gene products 
are denied to all males. Males demethylate that sequence in their sperm cells, so females 
get readable copies of these genes on the X-chromosomes they receive from their fathers 
(Skuse and al 1997). Naturally, when this research was reported in the media it was 
announced as the discovery that sex differences are in the genes: 'Genes say boys will be 
boys, and girls will be sensitive' (Radford 1997).  
 
Epigenetic inheritance research has focused on mechanisms within the cell. 
Developmental systems thinkers have emphasized a wider range of epigenetic 
mechanisms (Gray 1992; Griffiths and Gray 1994; Griffiths and Gray 2001). The 
characteristics of epigenetic inheritance systems within the cell are shared by many extra-
cellular structures. Some castes of the aphid Colophina arma  require a growth spurt as 
part of their life-cycle. These and only these castes inherit the micro-organisms that make 
the chemicals on which this growth spurt depends (Moran and Baumann 1994). The 
morphology of queens and the colony structure of the fire ant Solenposis invicta  differ 
radically between genetically similar lineages of the species because of stably replicated 
pheremonal nest 'cultures' (Keller and Ross 1993). Any queen raised in a colony with a 
particular culture will found a colony with the same culture, as shown by moving eggs 
from one culture to the other. Many parasites, both vertebrate and invertebrate, maintain 
associations with particular host species over evolutionary time through "host-
imprinting". Thus, some insects lay their eggs on the plant whose leaves they tasted as 
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larvae. Some parasitic finches lay their eggs in the nest of the host species which they 
imprinted on as chicks (Immelmann 1975). “Host switching" occurs on the rare occasions 
when this mechanism malfunctions and the mother lays her eggs on the wrong plant or in 
the wrong nest. On the still more rare occasions when these misplaced eggs flourish, the 
imprinting mechanism will ensure that this new, epigenetic mutant form reliably 
reproduces itself. Clearly, all the mechanisms discussed here are candidates for 
evolutionary explanation - they did not come about by accident. This means that the 
physical traces by which these mechanisms operate have biological functions and thus, 
on the teleosemantic approach recommended by Maynard Smith, that these traces contain 
information. Hence, just like causal information, teleosemantic information obeys the 
parity thesis. 
 
The mechanism of epigenetic inheritance that takes us furthest from the nucleus is so-
called 'niche construction' (Odling-Smee 1988; Odling-Smee, Laland et al. 1996; Laland, 
Odling-Smee et al. 2001). Many features of an organism's niche exist only because of the 
effects of previous generations of that species on the local environment. One of the 
earliest examples of this phenomenon to be clearly recognized was the co-evolution of 
the eucalypts with the current pattern of bush fires in Australia (Mount 1964). It is, 
however, unclear whether the collectively constructed features of a species' niche can be 
regarded as part of each individual organism, and hence whether they can be assigned 
biological functions and teleosemantic information content. More theoretical work is 
needed on the interpretation of this form of inheritance. 
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4. Stability and Inheritance 
Opponents of the parity thesis, such as Maynard-Smith, are well aware of the role of non-
genetic factors in development and have a standard strategy for discounting them. This 
strategy is to question the intergenerational stability of non-genetic factors, and/or their 
potential to produce the kind of variation upon which natural selection can act. Thus: 
"Differences due to nature are likely to be inherited, whereas those due to nurture are 
not; evolutionary changes are changes in nature, not nurture; traits that adapt an 
organism to its environment are likely to be due to nature." (Maynard Smith 2000, 
189) 
'The special status of genetic factors is deserved for one reason only: genetic factors 
replicate themselves, blemishes and all, but non-genetic factors do not." (Dawkins 
1982, 99) 
Clearly, the phenomenon of epigenetic inheritance defeats the simplest version of this 
defense. Developmental systems theory argues that we should define ‘inheritance’ so that 
something is inherited just if it passes from generation to generation in such a way that 
evolution can act on its variant forms. Hence, every element of the developmental matrix 
which is reliably replicated in each generation and which plays a role in the production of 
the evolved life-cycle of the organism counts as something which is inherited (Griffiths 
and Gray 1994). The more conservative 'extended replicator view' goes some distance in 
the same direction (Sterelny, Dickison et al. 1996). It follows that genes cannot be 
singled out as the sources of developmental information on the grounds that they and they 
alone persist through lineages long enough for cumulative selection to act upon them. 
Lineages can be selected for having good methylation patterns or good symbionts or 
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being imprinted on a good host. These features can persist for evolutionarily significant 
periods of time. Some other factor needs to be added to the insistence on stable 
inheritance in order to defend the special, informational status of genes. One candidate is 
the idea that genetic causes are unique in being ‘symbolic’ or ‘semiotic’. In his most 
recent discussion, Maynard Smith claims that genes are symbolic and other 
developmental factors are not, because there is no intrinsic connection between the nature 
of the gene and the developmental outcome it produces (Maynard Smith 2000, 185). In 
his commentary on Maynard Smith, Peter Godfrey Smith points out that the apparent 
difference is generated by looking at the distal effects of genetic causes, which depend on 
an array of other causal factors, while concentrating on the proximal effects of non-
genetic causes, which, like the proximal effects of DNA, are uniquely determined by 
physical laws (Godfrey-Smith 2000, 203). In response to this criticism, Maynard Smith 
introduces a second role for biological teleology in his account of information. A cause is 
semiotic or symbolic when it has its effect via an ‘evolved receptor’ that has been 
selected to confer one of many possible causal ‘interpretations’ on the signal (Maynard 
Smith 2000, 215). Whatever its virtues as an analysis of the nature of biological 
information, this new suggestion fails to generate a principled difference between genetic 
and epigenetic causes. For example, the mechanisms of habitat and host imprinting 
described above are clearly ‘evolved receptors’ in Maynard Smith’s sense. They have 
been selected to confer a highly specific ‘interpretation’ on an otherwise meaningless 
chemical input, but in these cases the signal that does not take the form of a DNA 
sequence. 
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There is something fundamentally puzzling about Maynard Smith's decision to advocate 
a teleosemantic interpretation of information talk in biology.  If genetic information is 
teleosemantic information then it can have only a distant relationship to the actual genetic 
code. The genetic code clearly does not derive its semantic aspect from teleology. The 
selective history of a sequence of DNA is entirely irrelevant to its meaning in the genetic 
code. AAA means Lysine even when it is part of a section of junk DNA with no selection 
history or when it has been inserted by an incompetent biotechnologist who intended it to 
mean Leucine. This problem cannot be fixed by regarding the biological functions of 
these individual DNA codons as derived from the general functions of that type of codon, 
since it is generally supposed that codon to amino acid pairings themselves are ‘frozen 
accidents’ and not adaptations. More tentatively, I would suggest that insofar as 
information talk in developmental biology is related to concepts of biological function, it 
is to the ahistorical, causal-contribution notion of function, rather than the evolutionary 
concept of adaptive function. In an important study of functional language in biology, 
Ronald Amundson and George Lauder have suggested that the causal-contribution notion 
of function predominates in sciences such as physiology and anatomy (Amundson and 
Lauder 1994). Like physiologists and anatomists, developmental biologists are primarily 
concerned with proximal explanations (how mechanisms work at the current time) rather 
than ultimate explanations (why they evolved). So teleosemantics seems doubly 
inappropriate as an analysis of information talk in molecular developmental biology. 
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5. Evolvability and Information 
At this point I will leave Maynard Smith’s most recent, teleosemantic analysis and turn to 
what I believe is a more promising approach found in his earlier work. Maynard-Smith 
and Eörs Szathmáry have argued that the genetic inheritance system and cultural 
transmission in humans are the only two systems which display what they call ‘unlimited 
heredity’(Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995). Only these 'unlimited’ inheritance 
systems, they argue, should really be thought of as 'coding' for outcomes. To make their 
distinction, Maynard Smith and Szathmary argue that most inheritance systems can only 
mutate between a limited number of heritable states which can be specified in advance.  
Habitat imprinting, for example, can only lead organisms to choose different habitats and 
DNA methylation can only choose whether existing genes will be on or off. The genome 
and language, however, both have recursive structures. Their basic constituents can be 
put together in many different combinations and these combinations can be of any length. 
Hence these inheritance systems have an unlimited number of possible heritable states. 
At first sight it may not clear why this provides a justification for viewing those systems 
and no others as transmitting information.  One way to grasp the thought behind Maynard 
Smith and Szathmary’s proposal is to see them as providing an objective justification for 
fixing the source/channel distinction so that genes (or culture) are the information source.  
The other causes of heritable variation are mere channel conditions because they have 
relatively few alternative settings. Only in genes (or culture) do we find a signal source 
with enough possible states to signal the vast range of possibilities that evolution needs. 
The distinction between limited and unlimited heredity systems is an important one, and 
may provide insights into one of the key innovations that enabled the diversification of 
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early life into the vast range of forms we see today. I will argue, however, that it is 
putting too much weight on the distinction to use it, as Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 
seem to wish, as a basis to claim that developmental information resides in the genes and 
that other causal factors provide mere material support to decode this information.  A 
developmental systems interpretation, according to which developmental information 
exists in the whole matrix of material resources that are need to reconstruct a 
developmental outcome, is equally consistent with the distinction between limited and 
unlimited heredity systems and with the insights into the evolutionary process that it 
provides. 
 
The limited/unlimited distinction seems to support the idea that genes are the signal and 
the rest of the developmental system is a channel because it suggests that the genes have 
a vastly greater capacity to ‘signal’ alternative outcomes. In effect, Maynard Smith and 
Szathmary propose to partition the total number of developmental outcomes that can be 
generated by a developmental system between the various inheritance systems that make 
up that system. The number of outcomes allotted to an inheritance system measures its 
‘limitedness’ and the genetic inheritance system is allotted far more outcomes than any 
other system.  But how is this partition of outcomes to be made? Maynard Smith and 
Szathmáry assume that the number of permutations of DNA codons, or perhaps of entire 
genes, is the relevant measure for the genetic inheritance system and that some 
corresponding measure of the number of permutations of physical parts is the appropriate 
measure for other inheritance systems. But these are not appropriate measures. For any 
given inheritance system the range of physical changes that count as evolutionary 
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changes is restricted to those that can be made use of by the rest of the existing system. 
The main lesson of the major evolutionary transitions that are the focus of Maynard 
Smith and Szathmáry’s work is that evolution creates entirely new kinds of 
developmental systems that massively expand the possible interpretations of existing 
developmental resources, including genes. One way to see this is to consider how many 
evolutionary possibilities come into existence when a ‘limited’ heredity system 
undergoes a change. Consider, for example, the evolutionary possibilities that can be 
‘signalled’ by a base pair substitution in the DNA of a eukaryote cell that cannot be 
signaled by those substitutions in a prokaryote cell. As Maynard Smith and Szathmary 
themselves describe, that vast swathe of evolutionary possibilities came into existence 
through evolutionary change mediated by a limited heredity system.  Membranes cannot 
be constructed without an existing membrane template into which to insert newly 
synthesized proteins. Hence, major changes to the partitioning of the cell require 
variation to arise through the membrane heredity system, not through mutations of the 
DNA.  In effect, the measure of ‘limitedness’ that Maynard Smith and Szathmáry adopt 
allots to the genetic inheritance system all the outcomes that can be generated by making 
changes to that system across the full range of possibilities for the other systems while 
allocating to the other systems only the number of outcomes they could produce given 
one possible genome. That is why it is not an appropriate measure if the limited/unlimited 
distinction is to be used to judge the capacity of inheritance systems to ‘signal’ (cause) 
evolutionary possibilities. It would be no less (and no more) meaningful to allocate to the 
genetic inheritance system only the range of outcomes it could generate given one state of 
the other inheritance systems. The other inheritance systems would receive all the 
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outcomes that could be generated by permuting the genetic system in the presence of the 
remaining states of that inheritance system. 
 
A closely related point is that the huge potential of differences in genes, language and 
perhaps pheremones in social insects) to cause new evolutionary possibilities stems from 
the fact that these differences 'mean something' to the rest of the developmental system.  
If the rest of the system surrounding the genes were such that indefinitely many base-pair 
combinations collapsed into only a few developmental outcomes, then the genetic 
inheritance system would not be unlimited.  It is not hard to imagine cellular machinery 
with this result - the existing genetic code is substantially redundant in just this way.  
Hence, the unlimited nature of the genetic inheritance system is more accurately seen as a 
property of the developmental system as a whole and not of the genome in isolation. The 
language of separate ‘inheritance systems’ can itself be highly misleading in some 
biological contexts. Methylation inheritance, for example, is a mechanism of gene 
regulation, making it odd to describe it as a separate ‘system’ from the genetic ‘system’. 
From a ‘selfish gene’ viewpoint a gene and the methyl groups attached to it are separate 
replicators, but no more so than any two genes. From a developmental systems viewpoint 
genes and methylation patterns are separate developmental resources, but they are 
elements of one developmental system (Griffiths and Gray 2001). 
 
It has never been part of the developmental systems tradition to deny that nucleic acids 
and natural languages are distinctive elements of developmental systems. The point of the 
‘parity thesis’ is to prevent these empirical differences turning into a kind of scientific 
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metaphysics, as happens when genes are identified with information (or even ‘form’) and 
everything else in development with mere matter. This distracts attention from the many 
ways in which non-genetic resources sometimes play biological roles more usually 
associated with genes. It also leads to the empirically inappropriate lumping together of 
very different non-genetic resources (the ‘environment’). From a developmental systems 
perspective, unlimited heredity is simply another important, empirical property of DNA, 
and perhaps of other resources, such as pheremones in their role in causing caste-
differences in the morphology and behavior of social insects i.  
 
6. Developmental Switches and Bioinformatics 
It is clear that an analysis of ‘information’ such that genes are the sole or main bearer of 
developmental information has still not been adequately defended. It is less clear why 
such an analysis is needed. Developmental systems theorists and other critics of 
‘information talk’ do not deny the unique biological role of genes as protein templates, 
nor the central role of gene products in development, nor do they deny ‘molecular 
Weismannism’ – the prohibition on the inheritance of acquired characteristics via the 
genetic material (with the exception of a few retro-copying phenomena accepted on all 
sides). Conversely, advocates of the genetic program do not deny the existence, or even 
the evolutionary importance, of epigenetic inheritance. There are genuine disagreements 
among commentators on contemporary developmental biology over the relative promise 
of more program-like and more dynamicist models of gene regulation, but the lines of 
cleavage among the disputants do not align with those in the debate over genetic 
information, as Maynard Smith himself remarks (Maynard Smith 2000, 218). In any case, 
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that dispute does not turn on whether all the information being processed in a 
developmental program comes from genetic factors.  
 
If the idea that ‘biology is an information technology’ is neither obviously true nor a 
‘forced choice’ on which biologists must take a stand if they are to do research, why is 
the idea so widely accepted? Partly, of course, because of the central role of information 
in the contemporary scientific world-view (Keller 1995; Oyama 2000a). Another widely 
acknowledged factor is the misinterpretation of Weismann diagrams (Griesemer and 
Wimsatt 1989; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 64; Sterelny 2000). The now standard 
diagrammatic representation of evolution shows a causal arrow from genes to phenotypes 
and a causal arrow from the genes of one generation to those of the next (Maynard Smith 
1993: Figure 8). There are no causal arrows that represent the influence of organisms on 
the reproduction of their genes, nor the many influences that organisms exert on their 
offspring in addition to reproducing their genes. Both the general cultural enthusiasm for 
information and the modern Weismann diagram are clearly important in giving the 
genetic program its air of common sense. But there is another factor closely related to the 
themes of this paper that has been less widely acknowledged. This factor can be 
represented by a (very bad) argument:  
(1) There is a genetic code 
(2) In molecular developmental biology there is talk of signals, switches, master 
control genes, and so forth. 
(3) Therefore, the information flowing in (2) is information in the code of (1) 
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In this blunt form the argument sounds merely frivolous. But many discussions of 
molecular biology, especially those for a non-technical audience, insinuate something 
surprisingly close to it. In his recent paper, Maynard Smith presents something quite 
close to this argument in a section immediately preceding his analysis of biological 
information, entitled 'Is the Genome a Developmental Program?'. Here are the first and 
last sentences of the section and a representative passage from in between: 
 
There is, I think, no serious objection to speaking of a genetic code, or to asserting 
that the gene codes for the sequence of amino acids in a protein. 
 
However, an organism is more than a bag of specific proteins. Development 
requires that different proteins be made at different times, in different places. A 
revolution is now taking place in our understanding of this process.  The picture 
that is emerging is one of a complex hierarchy of genes regulating the activity of 
other genes. Today, the notion of genes sending signals to other genes is as central 
as the notion of a genetic code was forty years ago. 
 
Informational terminology is invading developmental biology, as it earlier 
invaded molecular biology. In the next section I try to justify this usage. 
(Maynard Smith 2000,187-9). 
 
While not quite my very bad argument, this series of points is clearly meant to suggest 
that since the genetic code is 'real science' and not mere metaphor, it is only a matter of 
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time before other information talk in biology becomes real science too. At best, this is a 
very weak inductive argument, at worst it is equivocation on the word ‘information’ in 
several different senses. It is worth pointing out that a number of historians of science 
have suggested the exact opposite: that the history of information talk in molecular 
developmental biology is one of consistent retreat from literal to metaphoric in the light 
of increased understanding of molecular processes (Sarkar 1996; Chadarevian 1998). 
 
The very bad argument (hereafter 'VBA') is one aspect of what Sarkar means when he 
says that loose information talk 'leads to a misleading picture of possible explanations in 
molecular biology'. (Sarkar 1996, 187). The information metaphor suggests a 'bottom-up' 
explanatory strategy in molecular biology, rather than a 'top-down' one. A bottom-up 
strategy tries to infer the developmental significance of a DNA sequence from the 
sequence itself, looking at the sequence to determine its product and looking at that 
product and other gene products to determine how they will interact in development. The 
alternative, top-down strategy begins by studying the developmental process, works out 
which gene products are involved and uses the sequence of these products to locate the 
DNA sequences from which they are made. A realistic picture of work in contemporary 
developmental biology is that it is at least as much top-down as bottom-up. Note also that 
the top-down strategy automatically locates and takes account of epigenetic causal factors 
in development, while the bottom-up strategy finds their involvement in developmental 
processes an obstacle to upward progress. 
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I recently came across a rather striking example of the use of the VBA to suggest that 
molecular developmental biology proceeds by a pure bottom-up strategy. Once again, 
sequential quotations can be fitted into the framework of the VBA: 
 
One great discovery was that a set of three rungs contains the information to make 
one amino acid. So the set of rungs AAA will make one amino acid, while the 
rungs ACG will make a different amino acid 
 
After [the human genome project] we can look for the small section of DNA that 
holds the instructions to grow a new arm. ... molecular biologists studying the 
common fruit fly found the section of DNA that controlled the growth of its eyes. 
They learnt to switch on the growth of eyes... 
 
But even when we have mapped the whole of the human DNA, there's another 
hurdle to jump before we can start growing arms. The DNA is huge! ... That's 
why the science of bioinformatics has been invented. (Kruszelnicki 1998) 
 
These quotes are from a leaflet issued to persuade students to enroll in a degree in 
bioinformatics. Bioinformatics is designed to produce biologically literate graduates 
trained in computational techniques that will allow them to handle the vast amounts of 
information about genes currently being generated by molecular biology. But deft use of 
the VBA suggests that bioinformatics deals with developmental information encoded in 
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genes - the blueprint for life, and a much more exciting prospect for school-leavers than 
applied computing. 
 
7. Conclusion: the Code, the Code and noting but the Code 
There really is a genetic code, but beyond that most 'information talk' in biology is a 
picturesque way to talk about correlation and causation. Such loose information talk is 
equally applicable to non-genetic developmental factors. Information locutions can be 
used teleosemantically, but that usage too is equally applicable to other factors. It is also 
unlikely that this, teleosemantic sense is what is intended by most information talk in 
molecular developmental biology, which is a science of proximate mechanisms not of 
ultimate origins. There are numerous important differences between what DNA does in 
development and the roles played by other causal factors, but these differences do not 
map onto a distinction between informational and material causation. The present 
atmosphere, in which information talk is only applied to genes, makes that way of talking 
highly misleading. I have suggested here that it misleads people about the forms of 
explanation in molecular biology. I also believe that the asymmetrical use of information 
talk partly explains the persistence of genetic determinism, but that is an argument for 
another place (Griffiths Forthcoming). 
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Notes 
                                                 
 
* A version of this paper was read at the International Society for the History, Philosophy 
and Social Studies of Biology in Oaxaca, Mexico in June 1999. I am indebted to that 
audience and to Russell Gray and Robert Olby for comments on the manuscript. 
 
i Another slightly different interpretation of the limited/unlimited heredity distinction 
would be to it to argue that only genes have the capacity to generate fine-grained 
response to selection and thus to give rise to adaptation. This point could be combined 
with the teleosemantic approach described above to yield the result that since only genes 
support genuine adaptation, only genes carry (teleo-) information. As Russell Gray has 
pointed out, this implicitly assumes that epigenetic inheritance systems must have 
evolutionary potential separately from one another and that only discrete, as opposed to 
continuous, variations count as alternative states of an inheritance system. The cards are 
being stacked against extra genetic inheritance in numerous ways. However: 
Extragenetic changes can also be piecemeal and incremental.  Just as natural 
selection can favor combinations of genes at different loci, so selection might 
favor combinations of endosymbionts.  Quantitative variations in cytoplasmic 
factors, nest design, and habitat preferences could also all be passed on 
extragenetically.  So although combinations of these factors are not unlimited, 
they can be quite large enough to allow a fine-grained response to selection (Gray, 
In Press, xxx-xxx) 
